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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
 
No. 97-1570 
 
A&H SPORTSWEAR INC.; MAINSTREAM 
SWIMSUITS, INC., 
       Appellants in No. 97-1570 
 
v. 
 
VICTORIA'S SECRET STORES, INC.; 
VICTORIA'S SECRET CATALOGUE, INC. 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. No. 94-cv-07408 ) 
(District Judge: Hon. Franklin S. VanAntwerpen) 
 
Argued May 19, 1998 
 
Before: SLOVITER, GREENBERG and GIBSON,* 
Circuit Judges 
 
Resubmitted December 14, 1998 
 
Before: SLOVITER, GREENBERG and GIBSON,* Circuit 
Judges 
 
(Filed January 21, 1999) 
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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
SLOVITER, Circuit Judge. 
 
This trademark infringement action was filed by A&H 
Sportswear Inc. and its affiliate, Mainstream Swimsuits, 
Inc., the maker and distributor respectively of swimwear 
under the trademark MIRACLESUIT (together "A&H"), 
against Victoria's Secret Stores, Inc. ("VS Stores"), and 
Victoria's Secret Catalogue, Inc. ("VS Catalogue"), (together 
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"VS"), a well-known manufacturer of lingerie and now 
swimwear. The District Court gave judgment for VS on 
A&H's claim that VS's use of THE MIRACLE BRA on its 
lingerie infringed the MIRACLESUIT trademark, finding that 
there was no likelihood of confusion. The District Court 
also found that VS had violated the Lanham Act by its use 
of THE MIRACLE BRA on its swimwear, finding a 
"possibility of confusion" with the MIRACLESUIT swimsuit 
made by A&H, and ordered certain relief. 
 
VS appeals the judgment that THE MIRACLE BRA 
swimwear infringes A&H's MIRACLESUIT trademark (No. 
97-1541), arguing that the District Court applied an 
erroneous standard of law. A&H filed a cross appeal (No. 
97-1570) contending that the District Court clearly erred in 
failing to find a likelihood of confusion between THE 
MIRACLE BRA mark and A&H's prior MIRACLESUIT mark. 
 
This panel of the court heard argument on the appeal 
and cross-appeal on May 19, 1998. Thereafter, we 
recommended that the court originate a rehearing en banc 
to review whether it wished to adhere to the standard of 
possibility of confusion applied by the District Court. After 
giving the parties an opportunity to be heard on that issue, 
the court voted to consider VS's appeal (No. 97-1541) en 
banc, but resubmitted A&H's cross-appeal (No. 97-1570) to 
the panel as not presenting any issue requiring en banc 
consideration. Accordingly, we turn to the issues raised on 
A&H's cross-appeal. 
 
I. 
 
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
 
The facts underlying this cross-appeal are set forth in the 
District Court's published opinion, A&H Sportswear Co. v. 
Victoria's Secret Stores, Inc., 926 F. Supp. 1233 (E.D. Pa. 
1996) (addressing liability).1 We will set forth the pertinent 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. The court's other published opinion in this case, A&H Sportswear Co. 
v. Victoria's Secret Stores, Inc., 967 F. Supp. 1457 (E.D. Pa. 1997) (as 
amended), addresses remedies and relates solely to the appeal before the 
en banc court. 
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facts and procedural history needed to address the 
substance of this appeal, recognizing that our discussion 
will duplicate some of the material in the en banc opinion. 
The District Court's Findings of Fact from the opinion on 
liability are designated hereafter as FF. 
 
A&H, a closely held Pennsylvania corporation and maker 
of 10% of the nation's swimsuits, was issued a trademark 
for its MIRACLESUIT on October 27, 1992; its affiliate, 
Mainstream Swimsuits, Inc., a Pennsylvania corporation, 
served as the exclusive distributor of the MIRACLESUIT 
through its SWIM SHAPER division. Both corporations are 
controlled by members of the Waldman family. FF 1-2. 
 
The MIRACLESUIT was developed and subsequently 
marketed as a "control" suit whose patented fabric and 
design affords the wearer greater "hold-in" control of the 
hips and waist, which makes the wearer appear slimmer 
without the use of girdle-like undergarments. Most 
MIRACLESUITs contain underwire bras, are of a one-piece 
design, and retail for $45 to over $100. FF 14. Thefirst 
interstate use of the mark MIRACLESUIT and the first 
interstate sale of a MIRACLESUIT occurred in November 
1991. FF 21. The name MIRACLESUIT was chosen because 
it was "unique, dynamic, exciting, and memorable." FF 22. 
In 1992, the MIRACLESUIT was widely advertised, shown, 
and discussed in trade shows, magazines and the electronic 
media. FF 27. The MIRACLESUIT was also sold for a brief 
time in the VS catalogue (1,700 suits were purchased by VS 
in 1992 and 1993), but the relationship was discontinued 
because in several instances VS failed to identify the 
swimsuit by its MIRACLESUIT trademark. FF 29, 30. 
 
VS Stores, the nation's top retailer of lingerie, is a 
Delaware corporation headquartered in Columbus, Ohio, 
and operates over 650 stores throughout the country which 
focus on intimate apparel, with bra sales the leading 
product. FF 5. VS Catalogue, a Delaware corporation 
headquartered in New York City, is a mail order business 
with a much wider array of merchandise (including 
swimwear) sold through its over 300 million catalogues 
circulated each year. FF 6. The companies responsible for 
the stores and the catalogue are independent subsidiaries 
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of Intimate Brands, Inc., owned by The Limited, Inc., based 
primarily in London. FF 7. 
 
In 1992, VS Stores began developing a cleavage- 
enhancing bra which was introduced (then unnamed) in 
each store in August 1993 and first appeared in the VS 
catalogue in February 1994. FF 12, 17, 19. The bra uses 
removable pads, lace, straps, and underwire to accentuate 
the wearer's bust. FF 15. VS Stores sought a name for its 
new push-up bra that had a "fresh, flirtatious fun attitude." 
It chose THE MIRACLE BRA name in December 1992, 
allegedly after a model tried the new bra and exclaimed, 
"Wow, this is a miracle!" FF 23. The name THE MIRACLE 
BRA was first used in VS Stores in November 1993. FF 19. 
VS Stores was issued a registration for its trademark THE 
MIRACLE BRA on August 9, 1994. FF 25. Since itsfirst 
brisk sales, THE MIRACLE BRA, which retails for under 
$20, has been heavily marketed and has generated over 
$132 million in sales. FF 69. 
 
A&H, which did not initially object to VS's trademark use 
of THE MIRACLE BRA, did so after VS began to extend THE 
MIRACLE BRA into swimwear with its introduction of THE 
MIRACLE BRA bikini in the November 1994 VS catalogue 
and in ten VS stores as a test market. VS's sales of 
swimwear expanded rapidly, and in 1995 VS incorporated 
THE MIRACLE BRA design and trademark into a one-piece 
swimsuit. 
 
In August 1994, even before its first sale, VS Stores 
applied for a registration of THE MIRACLE BRA trademark 
for swimwear. FF 34. In February 1995, the Patent and 
Trademark Office (PTO) refused the registration on the 
basis of A&H's prior registration of the MIRACLESUIT, 
although A&H had not interposed an objection to the 
registration. FF 31, 36. Apparently because it had been 
using THE MIRACLE BRA name in lingerie, neither VS 
Stores nor VS Catalogue conducted a separate trademark 
search of THE MIRACLE BRA trademark as it applied to 
swimwear. FF 35. In December 1994, just a month after the 
introduction of THE MIRACLE BRA swimwear collection, 
A&H filed this suit alleging, inter alia, infringement of its 
trademark MIRACLESUIT, and seeking a preliminary 
 
                                5 
  
injunction and damages. The District Court consolidated 
the injunction hearing with a bench trial on the merits. 
 
Following a two-week bench trial, the District Court 
found no likelihood of confusion between THE MIRACLE 
BRA mark as applied to lingerie and the MIRACLESUIT 
mark. Accordingly, the court entered judgment for Victoria's 
Secret and against A&H on that claim of infringement. 
When VS appealed from the District Court's decision in 
favor of A&H with respect to THE MIRACLE BRA for 
swimwear, A&H filed this cross-appeal. We have 
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. S 1291. 
 
II. 
 
DISCUSSION 
 
The MIRACLESUIT v. THE MIRACLE BRA for Lingerie  
 
In a trademark infringement action, the "likelihood of 
confusion" between two marks is a factual matter, subject 
to review for clear error. Versa Prods. Co. v. Bifold Co., 50 
F.3d 189, 200 (3d Cir. 1995). Clear error exists when, 
giving all deference to the opportunity of the trial judge to 
evaluate the credibility of witnesses and to weigh the 
evidence, we are "left with a definite and firm conviction 
that a mistake has been committed." Anderson v. Bessemer 
City, 470 U.S. 564, 573 (1985) (quoting United States v. 
United States Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. 364, 395 (1948)). The 
District Court's conclusions of law are subject to plenary 
review. See Duraco Prods., Inc. v. Joy Plastic Enters., 40 
F.3d 1431, 1438 (3d Cir. 1994). 
 
In order for A&H, as the owner of a valid and legally 
protectable mark, to hold VS liable for trademark 
infringement under S 32 of the Lanham Act, it must show 
that VS has used a confusingly similar mark. Section 32(1) 
provides, in pertinent part: 
 
       Any person who shall, without the consent of the 
       registrant-- 
 
       (a) use in commerce any reproduction, counterfeit, 
       copy, or colorable imitation of a registered mark in 
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       connection with the sale, offering for sale, 
       distribution, or advertising of any goods or services 
       on or in connection with which such use is likely to 
       cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive; 
       . . . shall be liable in a civil action by the registrant 
       . . . . 
 
15 U.S.C. S 1114(1) (emphasis added). 
 
Similarly, S 43(a) of the Lanham Act, which governs 
unfair competition claims, provides in pertinent part: 
 
       Any person who, on or in connection with any goods or 
       services, . . . uses in commerce any word, term, name, 
       symbol, or device . . . or any false designation of origin 
       . . . which-- 
 
       (A) is likely to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, 
       or to deceive as to . . . the origin, sponsorship, or 
       approval of [his or her] goods, services, or 
       commercial activities by another person . . . shall be 
       liable in a civil action by any person who believes 
       that he or she is or is likely to be damaged by such 
       act. 
 
15 U.S.C. S 1125(a)(1) (emphasis added). 
 
The central inquiry in a trademark infringement case 
focuses on the likelihood of consumer confusion. The 
District Court determined that VS's use of THE MIRACLE 
BRA mark with lingerie did not create a likelihood of 
confusion with the MIRACLESUIT. 
 
The test to be applied to determine likelihood of 
confusion differs when the goods compete and when they 
do not. Where the trademarks involved are not used on 
directly competing merchandise we look to the ten "Scott 
factors" set forth in Scott Paper Co. v. Scott's Liquid Gold, 
Inc., 589 F.2d 1225, 1229 (3d Cir. 1978), sometimes also 
called "Lapp factors" after Interpace Corp. v. Lapp, Inc., 721 
F.2d 460 (3d Cir. 1983). The District Court sought to apply 
those ten factors assiduously, and after analyses 
summarized its conclusions as follows: 
 
       [W]e hold that with respect to the likelihood of 
       confusion between Plaintiffs' MIRACLESUIT and 
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       Defendants' THE MIRACLE BRA, (1) the two marks are 
       similar in that they share a dominant portion, the word 
       "miracle," yet remain distinct by the addition of the 
       word that follows (bra or suit) when designating those 
       respective goods; (2) the marks are both strong in their 
       respective industries which we believe are swimsuits 
       for Plaintiffs' MIRACLESUIT and lingerie for 
       Defendants' THE MIRACLE BRA. As those marks 
       extend into the industry dominated by the other (i.e., 
       MIRACLESUIT for lingerie or THE MIRACLE BRA for 
       swimwear), the strength of the marks and the amount 
       of protection they receive commensurately decrease; (3) 
       the goods are in different price categories; (4) the 
       Defendants had used their THE MIRACLE BRA mark 
       for slightly over one year prior to an incident of actual 
       confusion. The few incidents occurred just two months 
       following Defendants' extension of THE MIRACLE BRA 
       to swimwear, an industry in which Plaintiffs had 
       already produced and registered their MIRACLESUIT 
       for several years.[ ]; (5) based on the record before us, 
       Defendants did not adopt its THE MIRACLE BRA mark 
       with the conscious and deliberate bad faith intent to 
       free-ride on the success of Plaintiffs' mark; (6) the 
       evidence of actual confusion suggests it was 
       Defendants' entry into swimwear rather than into the 
       lingerie market with the name "miracle" that caused 
       potential confusion among consumers; (7) the goods 
       are marketed through the same media; (8) the products 
       are marketed to women of similar age; (9) the goods 
       serve different functions; and (10) the Plaintiffs' limited 
       involvement in developing and manufacturing bras is 
       not germane to our analysis where none of these efforts 
       were conducted using marks or names at issue in this 
       litigation. We therefore conclude that Plaintiffs have not 
       met their burden under the Scott Paper standard and 
       have not established a likelihood of confusion between 
       their MIRACLESUIT swimsuit and Defendants' THE 
       MIRACLE BRA (bra). 
 
926 F. Supp. at 1263-64. 
 
A&H argues, in essence, that the appropriate application 
of the ten-factor Scott/Lapp test required afinding of a 
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likelihood of confusion and hence a finding of infringement. 
We held in Fisons Horticulture, Inc. v. Vigoro Indus., 30 F.3d 
466 (3d Cir. 1994), that the "weight given to each factor in 
the overall picture, as well as its weighing for plaintiff or 
defendant, must be done on an individual fact-specific 
basis." Id. at 476 n.11. We consider the factors seriatim. 
 
Similarity of the Marks 
 
A&H contends that inasmuch as the District Court found 
the marks were nearly identical by use of "miracle," it erred 
in finding that the addition of a descriptive term ("bra" for 
one and "suit" for the other) to the word lessened any 
confusion. We have previously stated that descriptive terms 
(such as "bra" and "suit") must be considered in assessing 
infringement. See generally Country Floors, Inc. v. 
Partnership of Gepner and Ford, 930 F.2d 1056, 1065 (3d 
Cir. 1991). In evaluating the effect of similarity, it is also 
relevant that the use of the housemark "Victoria's Secret" 
frequently accompanies THE MIRACLE BRA product. 
Similarly, the MIRACLESUIT swimsuits generally had a 
sewn-in label bearing either the name SWIM SHAPER or 
MIRACLESUIT, and, after August, 1994, also bore 
hangtags. The key finding by the District Court regarding 
similarity was, "We do not believe that the overall 
impression created by THE MIRACLE BRA bra and the 
MIRACLESUIT swimsuit is essentially the same." 926 F. 
Supp. at 1257-58 (emphasis added). This is significant 
because we have previously stated that it is the"overall 
impression" created by the marks that should be the 
central focus. Fisons, 30 F.3d at 478. 
 
Strength of The Mark 
 
The District Court found that the word "miracle" is 
"fanciful," deserving the highest protection, and, thus, when 
applied to lingerie or swimsuits, is a "strong mark." 926 F. 
Supp. at 1259. However, the strength of MIRACLESUIT and 
THE MIRACLE BRA and the amount of protection they 
receive decrease when each mark is extended into the 
other's industry. See id. at 1263. 
 
A&H contends that the District Court failed to evaluate 
the commercial strength of the MIRACLESUIT mark in the 
context of its claim of reverse confusion, and we have found 
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no such discussion in the District Court's opinions. 
According to A&H, THE MIRACLE BRA presence in the 
marketplace overwhelmed the MIRACLESUIT mark such 
that consumers would likely be confused in thinking the 
senior MIRACLESUIT mark was attributed to the junior 
user, VS. The District Court did not so find, and we do not 
think such a finding was mandated by the evidence in the 
swimwear vs. lingerie inquiry. We leave A&H's contention 
regarding reverse confusion in the swimwear market to the 
decision in No. 97-1541. 
 
The Price of the Goods, the Time Before Confusion and 
Actual Confusion 
 
The District Court found that THE MIRACLE BRA and 
the MIRACLESUIT have different prices (under $20 
compared to over $50 respectively), see id. at 1260, a 
finding that favors VS. This led the District Court to find 
that the difference between the prices of the lingerie and 
the swimsuits diminishes any likelihood of confusion 
between the products. 
 
The court also noted the absence of any confusion arising 
from THE MIRACLE BRA for a year after it was introduced, 
and that only after THE MIRACLE BRA was extended to 
swimwear was there any incident of actual confusion. See 
id. at 1260. 
 
Defendants' Intent  
 
As intent has been held to play a role in the analysis of 
infringement, we look carefully at the District Court's 
finding that A&H failed to prove "bad faith or deliberate 
intent" to infringe by VS. Id. at 1261. The court reviewed 
the evidence A&H had presented in an effort to show 
intentional infringement, including the testimony of VS 
Stores's Marketing Director, and found that, despite VS's 
knowledge of the MIRACLESUIT mark and its failure to 
conduct an additional trademark search before it expanded 
THE MIRACLE BRA mark to swimwear, there was no bad 
faith on the part of VS. See id. 
 
A&H cites authority that intent is not necessary to prove 
infringement and that good faith is not a defense to 
infringement. We do not disagree as to the law. However, 
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the District Court's conclusion that there was no likelihood 
of confusion did not rest on the intent of VS. We recognize 
that another court might have drawn a different inference 
from VS's prior knowledge of the MIRACLESUIT mark but 
note that there were numerous other relevant facts before 
the court. We cannot conclude that the District Court 
clearly erred in finding no intent to infringe by VS. 
 
Similar Marketing/Media Channels & Customers 
 
The District Court found that VS and A&H "promote their 
products through the same channels of trade and through 
the same media." Id. at 1262, FF 43. It also found that the 
target customer base for the MIRACLESUIT and THE 
MIRACLE BRA bra is similar. FF 38, 39. Not surprisingly, 
VS contends that the District Court weighed this factor too 
favorably to A&H, and notes in support of its contention of 
error that it sells THE MIRACLE BRA only through the VS 
catalogue and VS stores. There is support for the District 
Court's finding and we cannot characterize it as clearly 
erroneous. 
 
Relationship of the Goods 
 
Consistent with each party's tendency to challenge any 
finding that it deems adverse, A&H disputes the District 
Court's finding that, although related, swimwear and 
lingerie "serve different functions" and are "separate 
industries." Id. at 1262-63. A&H hasfiled a motion asking 
this court to take judicial notice that these industries are 
"so closely related in their channels of trade and 
appearance as to be, at times, indistinguishable." We deny 
the motion as it requires a factual determination we believe 
is inappropriate for judicial notice. 
 
The reason we look to the relationship of the goods is to 
ascertain whether the goods were so related that a 
consumer would reasonably assume they were offered by 
the same source, thereby leading to confusion. See Fisons, 
30 F.3d at 481. The District Court found that "the 
consuming public would [not] expect A&H or Mainstream 
. . . to manufacture products in the lingerie market." 926 F. 
Supp. at 1263. We find no clear error, particularly as A&H 
had only limited involvement in the bra industry and, as 
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the District Court noted, the products were sold in distinct 
manners. 
 
A&H contends that the relationship between the products 
is further evidenced by VS's opposition to A&H's proposed 
registration of THE MAGIC BRA, a new product by A&H 
developed after the commencement of this lawsuit. A&H 
argues that because VS allegedly contends in the PTO 
opposition that the MAGIC BRA for swimsuits is 
confusingly similar to THE MIRACLE BRA for lingerie (a 
position it contends is contradictory to VS's arguments 
here), the District Court should have considered evidence of 
that PTO proceeding. Inasmuch as the facts sought to be 
introduced were post-trial, and the MAGIC BRA mark is 
different than the marks at issue here, the District Court 
did not abuse its discretion in refusing to consider that 
evidence. 
 
Factor Summary 
 
In balancing the relevant factors, no one of the Scott 
factors is more weighty than another except, perhaps, the 
similarity of the marks. See Fisons, 30 F.3d at 476 & n.11 
(emphasizing similarity). There is certainly similarity 
between the marks at issue, but that similarity was 
discounted by the District Court because the marks were 
not identical in their entirety. In sum, the District Court 
weighed each factor as required. After reviewing the record 
and the parties' argument, we conclude that the court did 
not commit clear error in finding there was no likelihood of 
confusion between THE MIRACLE BRA mark as applied to 
lingerie and the MIRACLESUIT mark, and hence no 
infringement.2 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. A&H also appeals the District Court's rejection of its contention that 
VS violated the Pennsylvania Antidilution law, 54 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. 
S 1124, which provides for relief upon a showing of a "likelihood of 
injury 
to business reputation or of dilution of the distinctive quality" of a 
registered mark. Id. The District Court noted that "predatory intent" was 
relevant in establishing an antidilution claim, 926 F. Supp. at 1265 
(citing Nugget Distribs. Coop. v. Mr. Nugget, Inc., 776 F. Supp. 1012, 
1024 (E.D. Pa. 1991)). Having found no bad faith on the part of VS, the 
court rejected the state claim. We find no error in the District Court's 
dismissal of this claim. 
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III. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
For the reasons set forth, we will affirm the judgment of 
the District Court in favor of VS on A&H's claim arising out 
of THE MIRACLE BRA with lingerie. 
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